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nix-super/src/nix-worker/main.cc

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* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
#include "shared.hh"
#include "local-store.hh"
#include "util.hh"
* When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user. The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so the caller can be completely unprivileged. This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on. Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure store operations. Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket. That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 21:54:43 +02:00
#include "serialise.hh"
* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
using namespace nix;
* When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user. The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so the caller can be completely unprivileged. This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on. Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure store operations. Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket. That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 21:54:43 +02:00
void processConnection(Source & from, Sink & to)
* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
{
* When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user. The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so the caller can be completely unprivileged. This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on. Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure store operations. Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket. That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 21:54:43 +02:00
store = boost::shared_ptr<StoreAPI>(new LocalStore(true));
* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
* When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user. The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so the caller can be completely unprivileged. This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on. Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure store operations. Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket. That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 21:54:43 +02:00
unsigned int magic = readInt(from);
* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
if (magic != 0x6e697864) throw Error("protocol mismatch");
* When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user. The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so the caller can be completely unprivileged. This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on. Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure store operations. Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket. That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 21:54:43 +02:00
writeInt(0x6478696e, to);
debug("greeting exchanged");
* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
}
void run(Strings args)
{
bool slave = false;
bool daemon = false;
for (Strings::iterator i = args.begin(); i != args.end(); ) {
string arg = *i++;
if (arg == "--slave") slave = true;
}
* When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user. The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so the caller can be completely unprivileged. This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on. Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure store operations. Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket. That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 21:54:43 +02:00
if (slave) {
FdSource source(STDIN_FILENO);
FdSink sink(STDOUT_FILENO);
processConnection(source, sink);
}
* Skeleton of the privileged worker program. * Some refactoring: put the NAR archive integer/string serialisation code in a separate file so it can be reused by the worker protocol implementation.
2006-11-30 21:19:59 +02:00
else if (daemon)
throw Error("daemon mode not implemented");
else
throw Error("must be run in either --slave or --daemon mode");
}
void printHelp()
{
}
string programId = "nix-store";
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