Commit graph

112 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eelco Dolstra
295027f533 Include config.h before any other header
"config.h" must be included first, because otherwise the compiler
might not see the right value of _FILE_OFFSET_BITS.  We've had this
before; see 705868a8a9.  In this case,
GCC would compute a different address for ‘settings.useSubstitutes’ in
misc.cc because of the off_t in ‘settings’.

Reverts 3854fc9b42.

http://hydra.nixos.org/build/3016700
2012-09-11 14:45:42 -04:00
Eelco Dolstra
b7fd2c2822 Use "#pragma once" to prevent repeated header file inclusion 2012-07-18 14:59:03 -04:00
Eelco Dolstra
93227ff65c * Eliminate all uses of the global variable ‘store’ from libstore.
This should also fix:

    nix-instantiate: ./../boost/shared_ptr.hpp:254: T* boost::shared_ptr<T>::operator->() const [with T = nix::StoreAPI]: Assertion `px != 0' failed.

  which was caused by hashDerivationModulo() calling the ‘store’
  object (during store upgrades) before openStore() assigned it.
2011-08-31 21:11:50 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
b2027f70d9 * Fix a huuuuge security hole in the Nix daemon. It didn't check that
derivations added to the store by clients have "correct" output
  paths (meaning that the output paths are computed by hashing the
  derivation according to a certain algorithm).  This means that a
  malicious user could craft a special .drv file to build *any*
  desired path in the store with any desired contents (so long as the
  path doesn't already exist).  Then the attacker just needs to wait
  for a victim to come along and install the compromised path.

  For instance, if Alice (the attacker) knows that the latest Firefox
  derivation in Nixpkgs produces the path

    /nix/store/1a5nyfd4ajxbyy97r1fslhgrv70gj8a7-firefox-5.0.1

  then (provided this path doesn't already exist) she can craft a .drv
  file that creates that path (i.e., has it as one of its outputs),
  add it to the store using "nix-store --add", and build it with
  "nix-store -r".  So the fake .drv could write a Trojan to the
  Firefox path.  Then, if user Bob (the victim) comes along and does

    $ nix-env -i firefox
    $ firefox

  he executes the Trojan injected by Alice.

  The fix is to have the Nix daemon verify that derivation outputs are
  correct (in addValidPath()).  This required some refactoring to move
  the hash computation code to libstore.
2011-07-20 18:10:47 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
aa45027818 * Sync with the trunk. 2010-05-12 22:13:09 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
efc7a579e8 * Don't use the ATerm library for parsing/printing .drv files. 2010-04-19 13:46:58 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
594eaddd11 * When using the included sqlite/aterm libraries, build with
--enable-shared.
* In libutil/libstore/libexpr etc., link against sqlite and aterm.
* Some more header file hygiene.
2010-03-02 15:58:13 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
945d8218fb * Build correctly against newer ATerm releases. Fixes "error: 'union'
tag used in naming 'struct _ATerm'".
2009-12-16 15:29:50 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
4be5443882 * Remove unnecessary inclusions of aterm2.h. 2006-09-04 22:08:40 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
75068e7d75 * Use a proper namespace.
* Optimise header file usage a bit.
* Compile the parser as C++.
2006-09-04 21:06:23 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
05f0430de1 * Another change to low-level derivations. The last one this year, I
promise :-) This allows derivations to specify on *what* output
  paths of input derivations they are dependent.  This helps to
  prevent unnecessary downloads.  For instance, a build might be
  dependent on the `devel' and `lib' outputs of some library
  component, but not the `docs' output.
2005-01-20 14:10:19 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra
96de272b48 * Renamed normalise.cc' -> build.cc', `storeexprs.cc' ->
`derivations.cc', etc.
* Store the SHA-256 content hash of store paths in the database after
  they have been built/added.  This is so that we can check whether
  the store has been messed with (a la `rpm --verify').
* When registering path validity, verify that the closure property
  holds.
2005-01-19 16:39:47 +00:00
Renamed from src/libstore/storeexpr.hh (Browse further)