#pragma once #include "crypto.hh" #include "path.hh" #include "hash.hh" #include "content-address.hh" #include #include namespace nix { class Store; struct SubstitutablePathInfo { std::optional deriver; StorePathSet references; uint64_t downloadSize; /* 0 = unknown or inapplicable */ uint64_t narSize; /* 0 = unknown */ }; typedef std::map SubstitutablePathInfos; struct ValidPathInfo { StorePath path; std::optional deriver; // TODO document this Hash narHash; StorePathSet references; time_t registrationTime = 0; uint64_t narSize = 0; // 0 = unknown uint64_t id; // internal use only /* Whether the path is ultimately trusted, that is, it's a derivation output that was built locally. */ bool ultimate = false; StringSet sigs; // note: not necessarily verified /* If non-empty, an assertion that the path is content-addressed, i.e., that the store path is computed from a cryptographic hash of the contents of the path, plus some other bits of data like the "name" part of the path. Such a path doesn't need signatures, since we don't have to trust anybody's claim that the path is the output of a particular derivation. (In the extensional store model, we have to trust that the *contents* of an output path of a derivation were actually produced by that derivation. In the intensional model, we have to trust that a particular output path was produced by a derivation; the path then implies the contents.) Ideally, the content-addressability assertion would just be a Boolean, and the store path would be computed from the name component, ‘narHash’ and ‘references’. However, we support many types of content addresses. */ std::optional ca; bool operator == (const ValidPathInfo & i) const { return path == i.path && narHash == i.narHash && references == i.references; } /* Return a fingerprint of the store path to be used in binary cache signatures. It contains the store path, the base-32 SHA-256 hash of the NAR serialisation of the path, the size of the NAR, and the sorted references. The size field is strictly speaking superfluous, but might prevent endless/excessive data attacks. */ std::string fingerprint(const Store & store) const; void sign(const Store & store, const SecretKey & secretKey); std::optional contentAddressWithReferenences() const; /* Return true iff the path is verifiably content-addressed. */ bool isContentAddressed(const Store & store) const; static const size_t maxSigs = std::numeric_limits::max(); /* Return the number of signatures on this .narinfo that were produced by one of the specified keys, or maxSigs if the path is content-addressed. */ size_t checkSignatures(const Store & store, const PublicKeys & publicKeys) const; /* Verify a single signature. */ bool checkSignature(const Store & store, const PublicKeys & publicKeys, const std::string & sig) const; Strings shortRefs() const; ValidPathInfo(const ValidPathInfo & other) = default; ValidPathInfo(StorePath && path, Hash narHash) : path(std::move(path)), narHash(narHash) { }; ValidPathInfo(const StorePath & path, Hash narHash) : path(path), narHash(narHash) { }; ValidPathInfo(const Store & store, std::string_view name, ContentAddressWithReferences && ca, Hash narHash); virtual ~ValidPathInfo() { } static ValidPathInfo read(Source & source, const Store & store, unsigned int format); static ValidPathInfo read(Source & source, const Store & store, unsigned int format, StorePath && path); void write(Sink & sink, const Store & store, unsigned int format, bool includePath = true) const; }; typedef std::map ValidPathInfos; }