The recent fix for CVE-2024-38531 broke the sandbox on macOS
completely. As it’s not practical to use `chroot(2)` on
macOS, the build takes place in the main filesystem tree, and the
world‐unreadable wrapper directory prevents the build from accessing
its `$TMPDIR` at all.
The macOS sandbox probably shouldn’t be treated as any kind of a
security boundary in its current state, but this specific vulnerability
wasn’t possible to exploit on macOS anyway, as creating `set{u,g}id`
binaries is blocked by sandbox policy.
Locking down the build sandbox further may be a good idea in future,
but it already has significant compatibility issues. For now, restore
the previous status quo on macOS.
Thanks to @alois31 for helping me come to a better understanding of
the vulnerability.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fbCloses: #11002
- use the iterator in `CanonPath` to count `level`
- use the `CanonPath::basename` method
- use `CanonPath::root` instead of `CanonPath{""}`
- remove `Path` and `PathView`, use `std::filesystem::path` directly
Inspired by
010ff57ebb
From the original PR:
> We do not have any of these warnings appearing at the moment, but
> it seems like a good idea to enable [[nodiscard]] checking anyway.
> Once we start introducing more functions with must-use conditions we will
> need such checking, and the rust stdlib has proven them very useful.
It was added above this conditional
Worker::Worker(LocalStore & store)
: store(store)
{
/* Debugging: prevent recursive workers. */
if (working) abort();
working = true;
However, `working` has since been removed.
Source: 7f8e805c8e/src/libstore/build.cc (L2617)
The old `std::variant` is bad because we aren't adding a new case to
`FileIngestionMethod` so much as we are defining a separate concept ---
store object content addressing rather than file system object content
addressing. As such, it is more correct to just create a fresh
enumeration.
Co-authored-by: Robert Hensing <roberth@users.noreply.github.com>
Previously, the .chroot directory had permission 750 or 755 (depending
on the uid-range system feature) and was owned by root/nixbld. This
makes it possible for any nixbld user (if uid-range is disabled) or
any user (if uid-range is enabled) to inspect the contents of the
chroot of an active build and maybe interfere with it (e.g. via /tmp
in the chroot, which has 1777 permission).
To prevent this, the root is now a subdirectory of .chroot, which has
permission 700 and is owned by root/root.
Instead of running the builds under
`$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-build-user}`, run them
under `$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-daemon}/{subdir-owned-by-the-build-user}`
where the build directory is only readable and traversable by the daemon user.
This achieves two things:
1. It prevents builders from making their build directory world-readable
(or even writeable), which would allow the outside world to interact
with them.
2. It prevents external processes running as the build user (either
because that somehow leaked, maybe as a consequence of 1., or because
`build-users` isn't in use) from gaining access to the build
directory.
the `std::filesystem::create_directories` can fail due to insufficient
permissions. We convert this error into a `SysError` and catch it
wherever required.
#2230 broadened the scope of macOS hardlink exclusion but did not change the comments. This was a little confusing for me, so I figured the comments should be updated.
